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FREEDOM OR THEOCRACY?: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFGHANISTAN AND 
IRAQ 
By Hannibal Travis*  
“Afghans are victims of the games superpowers once played: their war was once 
our war, and collectively we bear responsibility.”1 
 “In the approved version of the [Afghan] constitution, Article 3 was amended to 
read, ‘In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the 
sacred religion of Islam.’ … This very significant clause basically gives the 
official and nonofficial religious leaders in Afghanistan sway over every action 
that they might deem contrary to their beliefs, which by extension and within the 
Afghan cultural context, could be regarded as ‘beliefs’ of Islam.”2 
“The lopsided [electoral] victory by Iraq’s Shiite Muslim alliance gives it the 
biggest voice in shaping the nation’s new government and constitution…. Will 
Sharia, or Islamic law, become the main reference for national policy on divorce, 
censorship, the role of women in society, broadcasting and public morality, as 
many Shiite clerics and their followers insist?”3 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1  During the past four years, the United States has replaced two dictatorial regimes in 
majority Islamic countries with more democratic governments.  These interventions enforced the 
“Bush doctrine,” the declaration of President George W. Bush after the murder of nearly 3,000 
Americans by Saudi and Egyptian terrorists on September 11 that all states “harboring” or 
supporting terrorists would see their leaders deposed and pro-American ones installed.4  The 
Bush doctrine, its adherents plausibly argue, has profoundly advanced the cause of human rights 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Specifically, it liberated Afghans and Iraqis from dictatorships with two 
of the worst human rights records in the world, replacing them with constitutional democracies 
ostensibly devoted to respecting individual rights.   
¶2 Activists for human rights and religious freedom have been more critical concerning the 
United States’ role in the political processes of Afghanistan and Iraq.  They argue that the 
paradoxical effect of President Bush’s policies is to have replaced two unstable, marginalized 
regimes with what may become enduring and universally recognized Islamic fundamentalist 
states, albeit with greater democratic credentials.5  The new constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
have enshrined Islam as the official religion and source of legislation, which no social policies 
may contravene.  This codification of religious fundamentalism was an inevitable byproduct, 
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some observers contend, of the delegation of the nation-building process in both countries to 
religious extremists who enjoyed devoted followings of armed militiamen.  
¶3 This article explores this debate by analyzing legal developments in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
with a particular focus on Afghanistan’s new constitution, ratified in early 2004 before the first 
post-Taliban elections were held.  The Afghan constitution symbolizes the unmistakable 
liberation of Afghanistan’s people from the despotic and even genocidal rule of the Taliban, but 
its many provisions requiring compatibility of government policy with an unwritten code of 
Islamic law may allow grave human rights violations to continue, and frustrate democratic 
demands for respect for international human rights standards and the country’s civil law 
traditions.  Accelerated judicial reform will be necessary to ensure that the provisions in the 
constitution for judicial review of laws for conformity to religious doctrine will not be utilized to 
implement theocratic rule, which is the result that many powerful Afghans, possessing armed 
militias used to intimidate their political opponents, are working towards.   
¶4 Afghan modernizers and fundamentalists have enjoyed varying degrees of foreign support 
and intervention throughout the twentieth century.  Depending on how the new constitution is 
interpreted, the past support of the U.S. and its allies to some of the most radical elements of the 
fundamentalist camp may have assured their enduring victory.  Part I of the Article explores the 
historical context in which Afghanistan’s new constitution was drafted and ratified, and the 
unique responsibility of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in creating that context.  Part II traces the 
rise and fall of the Taliban theocracy, which murdered thousands of political opponents and 
religious minorities, and intensified the fundamentalist oppression of Afghans instituted after the 
fall of the communist Afghan regime.  Part III describes how after the rout of the Taliban, the 
U.S. accepted Afghan fundamentalists into prominent positions from which they could control 
the process by which Afghanistan would draft and ratify its new constitution and develop a post-
Taliban legal system.  Part IV proposes some test cases for judging the implementation of 
Afghanistan’s new constitution and judicial reform efforts from the perspective of democracy 
and individual rights, including new bans on blasphemy and political secularism that are ripe for 
systematic abuse, plans to revive fundamentalist punishments avoided by most modern states 
such as stoning and amputation, and the ongoing oppression and enslavement of Afghan women 
and girls. 
¶5 The article concludes by drawing some parallels between the Afghan constitutional process 
and the ongoing process of transitioning Iraq from a nominally socialist dictatorship with a 
genocidal record into a so-called “Islamic democracy.”6  Many Iraqis, and almost all residents of 
majority Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, report being better off as a result of the U.S.-led 
operation to remove Saddam Hussein from power.7  But as in Afghanistan, the Iraqi delegates 
handpicked by the U.S and the U.N. to draft a constitution have established Iraq as a religious 
state.  At the behest of powerful fundamentalists with private armies, the drafters of the interim 
Iraqi constitution included language providing for judicial review of legislation for conformity to 
an unspecified, but probably fundamentalist, version of religious law.  At the same time, more 
than 100,000 Iraqis have died violently since the war began; Iraqi fundamentalists are murdering 
and raping members of the indigenous Christian population at an accelerated pace, prompting 
tens of thousands to flee the country; and Iraqi women are facing new restrictions on their 
freedom of movement and dress, as well as deprivation of their rights in marriage and divorce.  
The actions and public statements of Iraq’s most prominent religious leaders, to which the likely 
leaders of the new Iraq will defer if present trends continue, raise precisely the same sorts of 
concerns as the fundamentalist policies that have continued in Afghanistan.  
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN THEOCRACY  
Pre-Constitutional Afghanistan 
¶6 Like many countries, Afghanistan had no written constitution prior to the twentieth 
century.  The land was ruled either as a province of another empire, or independently by an 
Afghan monarch or local tribal leaders.8  For many centuries, the legal system had its basis in a 
combination of Sharia law9 and ancient customs such as the jirga, a council of tribal elders 
convened to settle important issues,10 and Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of conduct emphasizing 
conservative family values and the seclusion of women from public view.11  Around the turn of 
the 20th century, Afghanistan opened up to secular influences and women’s rights by abolishing 
some forced marriages, raising the minimum marriageable age, liberalizing women’s access to 
divorce and rights of inheritance, and prohibiting extravagant gifts to a bride’s family that could 
be used in essence to purchase a girl from her parents.12   
Constitutional Monarchy 
¶7 The events leading up to and following the adoption of the first Afghan constitution would 
be repeated many times in Afghan history: a set of policies looking towards the future and the 
West infuriated fundamentalists, whose opposition was violently suppressed but eventually 
succeeded, with foreign intervention, in deposing the regime responsible for the new policies.   
¶8 On April 9, 1923, Amanullah Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, secured the ratification by a 
Loya Jirga of Afghanistan’s first written constitution.13  The 1923 constitution set forth a 
blueprint for modernizing Afghanistan and assuring greater rights for Afghan women and 
religious minorities within the framework of Islamic governance.  It guaranteed that all Afghan 
subjects would have “equal rights in accordance with Sharia and the laws of the state.”14  Some 
Afghans interpreted this provision as entitling Afghan women to citizenship and equal rights.15  
The constitution promised greater rights to religious minorities such as the Hazaras, who as Shia 
Muslims had been labeled as infidels and massacred and enslaved in the nineteenth century for 
this reason.16  It abolished torture, slavery, and forced labor17; created a legislature, although the 
Amir would appoint the Prime Minister and many of its members18; and decreed that followers 
of religions other than Islam, such as Hinduism and Judaism, were entitled to the protection of 
the state.19  Elementary education became compulsory for all Afghan “citizens.”20   
¶9 Despite its modernizing aspirations, the 1923 constitution established what would be 
considered theocratic rule by contemporary standards.  A “theocracy,” literally speaking, would 
be the direct rule by a divine being on Earth21; this possibility having been disavowed by 
mainstream Christianity and Islam, most theocracies in fact consist of “government by priests or 
men claiming to know the will of God.”22  By this definition, Afghanistan’s 1923 constitution 
was theocratic by virtue of the authority it invested in men claiming to know the will of God.  
The constitution made the “sacred” and official religion of the state, and enshrined the King as 
the “servant and the protector of the true religion of Islam.”23  It instructed legislators to give 
“careful consideration” to the “requirements of the laws of Sharia.”24  Perhaps most importantly, 
it provided that in Afghan courts of justice, “all disputes and cases will be decided in accordance 
with the principles of Sharia and of general civil and criminal laws.”25  The judiciary, in this 
instance as in others, served as the key instrument of fundamentalist Islamic theocracy.26  
¶10 Taking on centuries-old customs, Amir Amnullah Khan introduced ambitious legislative 
reforms improving Afghan women’s rights.  The Amir declared that Afghan women would no 
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longer “be treated as second-class Muslims.”27  In 1921, he enacted a Family Code banning child 
marriage, marriages between close relatives, excessive dowries, and the exchange of women as 
“blood money” in payment of interfamilial disputes.28  He opened girls’ schools and sent women 
students abroad for higher education.29  After 1923, the Amir introduced Afghanistan’s first civil 
code,30 which abolished polygamy and marriages to all girls under the age of 18.31  His wife 
Soraya appeared unveiled in public and participated actively in politics, citing the example of 
women in the “early years of Islam.”32   
¶11 Not satisfied with the constitution’s gestures towards theocracy, and disappointed with 
King Amanullah’s record as the “protector” of Islam, Afghanistan’s religious elite quickly 
moved to overthrow and reverse his modernizing reforms.  The head of a prominent religious 
family, which served as “king makers” in Afghan society,33 immediately denounced the 1923 
constitution as a “communist” document.34  A rebellion reached the outskirts of the capital 
Kabul, and was only repelled when the Amir mobilized his new air force to strafe and bomb the 
advancing insurgents,35 and then executed the revolt’s leaders.36 
¶12 Rebels having nearly toppled his regime, the Amir called a Loya Jirga to amend the 1923 
constitution in several important respects designed to pacify Afghanistan’s religious elite.37   One 
amendment made the Hanafi school of Islamic law the official religious rite of Afghanistan.38  
Additional concessions from the Amir included “watering down” the rights of women,39 
reintroducing torture when “in accordance with the rules of the Sharia,”40 and allowing a Council 
of Islamic Scholars to “decide whether new laws were in accordance with Islamic law.”41   
¶13 After Amir Amanullah became King of Afghanistan in 1926, he announced further 
sweeping reforms aimed at helping Afghan women.42  He endorsed expanding Afghan girls’ 
access to education, proclaimed his opposition to the compulsory veiling of women, and imposed 
Western dress within the capital of Kabul.43  In response, Afghan religious leaders once again led 
conservative Afghan tribes in rebellion.  Under siege, King Amanullah abdicated the throne in 
early 1929.44  Historians tend to blame the King’s overhasty reforms for his downfall, especially 
those dealing with mandatory veiling, the seclusion of women, and forced and underage 
marriages.45  But the West failed to support the King who admired its values, and Britain actively 
worked to overthrow him.  Many Afghans and even the British press believed that the British 
Empire was behind Amanullah’s fall from power, given the Empire’s poor relations with him.46   
¶14 King Amanullah’s successors quickly overturned his reforms.  But in doing so, they did 
not return Afghanistan to a pre-modern or pre-constitutional condition.  Instead, they established 
an Islamic constitutional monarchy that, despite its theocratic aspects, also retained some of the 
1923 constitution’s gestures towards reform.   
¶15 A Loya Jirga in 1930 created Afghanistan’s next stable government and pronounced Nadir 
Shah as Afghanistan’s King.47  The King promulgated the second Afghan constitution in 1931.48  
With a few minor changes, it endured as Afghanistan’s governing charter for more than 30 
years.49  Like the 1923 constitution, it embraced tradition while looking tentatively towards the 
future.  On the side of tradition, it made the Hanafi school of Islam the state religion, established 
a requirement that all legislation conform to the Sharia, and gave religious authorities the power 
to review Afghan laws and governmental policies for correspondence to Sharia law.50  But it also 
guaranteed compulsory elementary education, freedom of the press within the limits of the 
Sharia, and a limited role for democratically elected officials to participate in the drafting of 
legislation.51  Afghan women became eligible to vote in elections, although the authorities later 
declared this provision to be incompatible with Islamic law.52 
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¶16 King Nadir Shah’s government enforced Afghan women’s obligation to wear the all-
covering burqa, a tent-like covering that obscures the entire person and leaves only a mesh 
opening to see through.53  The new King reinvigorated purdah (the Persian word for “curtain”), 
or the prohibition against women participating in public life or having contact with any men 
other than their husbands or those close relatives whom they are forbidden to marry.54  In 
Afghanistan, these “restrictions severely limit women’s activities, including access to education 
and employment outside the home. Many [women] are largely confined to their homes.”55 
¶17 The King was assassinated in 1933,56 leaving his throne to his 19-year old son Zahir.57  
King Zahir Shah would preside over the slow improvement of living conditions in Afghanistan 
for over 40 years after his father’s death in 1933.58  As Prime Minister, the King’s first cousin 
Muhammed Daoud Khan strove to develop Afghanistan’s economy by securing vast amounts of 
economic and military aid from the neighboring Soviet Union.59  The U.S. also initiated several 
important development projects in Afghanistan, but declined to supply military aid.60    
¶18 In 1959, Prime Minister Daoud created a major cultural crisis when the wives and 
daughters of the Afghan royal family appeared unveiled for the first time since Amanullah’s 
reign.61  Many religious leaders publicly condemned this display, but Daoud argued that Islam 
did not make the veiling and seclusion of women obligatory.62  Other educated women, 
particularly in Kabul, then began to abandon the veil, including growing numbers of nurses, 
midwives, and teachers.63  In response, the more conservative mullahs provoked riots and acid 
attacks on unveiled women,64 until Daoud had about 50 of them jailed and charged with treason 
and heresy.65  Daoud’s government quelled an armed uprising in Kandahar with advanced 
weaponry obtained from the Soviet Union.66  Daoud finally released the mullahs from custody, 
and they brought the unrest to a halt, agreeing that each Afghan family would be allowed to 
decide for itself whether its women would practice purdah.67   
¶19 In the 1960s, Afghanistan’s third constitution propelled the nation further towards 
democracy and respect for human rights, but like its 1923 model it would eventually fall to a 
combination of foreign intervention and the violent opposition of local radicals.  This time, the 
communists and fundamentalists would divide the country between them.  
¶20 King Zahir Shah set out to establish a constitutional monarchy that would provide for more 
democratic input and thereby build public support for the regime.68  Despite Daoud’s large 
victories in winning superpower development aid and ensuring greater participation for Afghan 
women in public life, the King successfully pressured him to resign as Prime Minister in 1963.69  
The next year, a Loya Jirga ratified a new constitution, drafted with French assistance.70  
Afghanistan’s 1964 constitution “limited the monarch’s absolute power through the creation of a 
parliament and the clear separation of powers.”71  The King could no longer enact laws without 
the approval of both houses of parliament.72  But he retained broad executive powers, including 
the powers to declare war and command the army; to appoint the Prime Minister and one-third of 
the Afghan Senate, dissolve the parliament, and veto legislation; and to appoint the members of 
the Supreme Court.73  The lower house of the Afghan parliament and one-third of the Afghan 
Senate would be elected to four-year terms by direct elections, subject to the King dissolving 
parliament and calling new elections at any time and for any cause.74 
¶21 The 1964 constitution loosened the requirements of previous Afghan constitutions that the 
state be governed in accordance with Sharia law.75  Like the 1923 constitution, it recognized 
Islam as the “sacred” and official religion of Afghanistan.76  But the 1964 constitution did not 
require that all Afghan laws conform to Sharia as such, stating that “there shall be no law 
repugnant to the basic principles of the sacred religion of Islam and the other values embodied in 
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this constitution.”77  Similarly, the constitution no longer anointed the King as the “protector of 
the true religion of Islam”78; instead it urged him to “protect the sacred principles of the religion 
of Islam.”79  These references to general “principles” provided the legislature with greater 
leeway to enact laws that presented some tension with the tenets of Islamic law taken literally.80  
Finally, the 1964 constitution no longer gave Sharia equal status with Afghanistan’s “general 
civil and criminal laws,”81 but made it authoritative only where no statute existed in the area.82   
¶22 One victory for religious conservatives in the 1964 constitution would have important 
consequences in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and that is the empowerment of the judiciary to 
enforce the Hanafi school of Islamic Sharia jurisprudence as Afghan law.  The Hanafi school is 
perhaps the least accommodating of the four major schools of Sharia law to the autonomy of 
women and children, as it has traditionally been construed to allow marriages to be contracted by 
a guardian on behalf of a minor child and to forbid women from securing a divorce under most 
circumstances.83  The 1964 constitution stated that where no law existed in an area, “the 
provisions of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shariaat of Islam shall be considered as law,”84 and 
required Afghan court, to render justice in cases not controlled by the constitution or statutory 
law “by following the basic principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shariaat of Islam….”85 
¶23 Although many subsequent commentators have stressed that the 1964 Constitution granted 
greater rights to Afghan women,86 the document did not make substantial advances in reforming 
women’s rights within the legal or judicial system.  The 1964 constitution gave all Afghan 
“people” equal rights and obligations before the law, as the 1923 constitution had given all 
Afghan “subjects” equal rights and duties before the law.87  Following the example of the 1923 
constitution, women’s equality and most of the other rights recognized in the 1964 constitution, 
including the right to liberty, property, freedom of speech and association, education, and 
employment, could be limited by provisions of the law.88  The 1964 constitution did innovate by 
granting Afghan women unprecedented opportunity to participate in government.  Women won 
the right to vote in parliamentary elections, be elected to parliament, serve as members of 
government, and even become government ministers.89  These rights became a reality for the 
first time in Afghan history, as women helped vote several of their number into parliament,90 and 
a woman became Minister of Public Health in 1965.91  
¶24 Ultimately, the 1964 constitution’s most enduring legacy may be that radical elements in 
Afghan society misused its freedoms to prepare the way for dictatorship and the deaths of 
countless Afghans.  Afghan communists, some of whom had been barred from Kabul University 
or recalled from study or work in the U.S. for expressing their radical ideas, became free to 
organize.92  Although the Kabul area elected a few Afghan women and leftists as representatives 
in the first elections under the 1964 Constitution, the parliament as a whole was dominated by 
the rural landowners and conservative religious leaders who could afford the high costs of 
running for office,93 which led many progressive young students and middle-class Afghans in 
Kabul to despair of democracy, and seek more radical solutions.94  In 1965, Muhammed Taraki 
and Babrak Karmal founded the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the 
Communist Party of Afghanistan “in all but name.”95  The PDPA attracted a growing 
membership among young students and intellectuals in Kabul University and the urban Afghan 
middle class.96  Afghan voters elected three PDPA members to the Afghan parliament in 1965, 
including Karmal.97  The Principal of Kabul Teachers College, Hafizullah Amin, joined the 
PDPA and was elected to parliament in 1969.98  Each of these three men – Taraki, Karmal, and 
Amin – would go on to assume the helm of dictatorial left-wing Afghan regimes.   
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¶25 Prominent Afghan fundamentalists lacked the public support necessary to be elected as 
such to the parliament as PDPA members were, but they organized disciplined cadres of 
followers during the 1960s and 1970s.  The ideas of the Egyptian fundamentalist Sayyed Qutb, 
the “intellectual light” of the Muslim Brotherhood, “attracted particular interest” in the Kabul 
Sharia faculty,99 which Kabul University opened in 1952.100  Al-Aznar of University in Egypt, 
which had taken the Kabul Sharia faculty under its wing,101 was a center of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s fundamentalist political activity.102  The head of the Kabul Sharia department, 
Professor Ghulam Muhammed Niazi, was deeply influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
campaign for Islamic fundamentalist rule while studying at al-Aznar University.103  The 
fundamentalist program of the Muslim Brotherhood and its progeny of jihadist groups is, in 
brief, a holy war that would replace the corrupt monarchs of Muslim countries with Islamic 
states that would govern all aspects of life, strictly segregating men and women and providing 
“humanity a complete cure for all its ills.”104   
¶26 From his perch as professor of Sharia law, Professor Niazi led the fundamentalist 
movement in Afghanistan.  He established cells in Kabul and Paghman dedicated to formulating 
strategy, and developed contacts with sympathetic government officials.105  Joining Professor 
Niazi in his campaign for an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan were two other graduates of al-
Azhar University, whose fundamentalism would determine the course of Afghan history for 
generations: Burhannudin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.106  Mr. Rabbani, who had translated 
the writings of Sayyed Qutb into the Afghan language of Dari,107 succeeded Professor Niazi as 
Amir of the Islamic Association of Afghanistan in 1972.108  Around this time, a young student 
leader at Kabul University named Gulbuddin Hekmatyar joined the Muslim Brotherhood109 and 
shortly became famous for throwing acid in the faces of unveiled Afghan women.110  Rabbani, 
Sayyaf, and Hekmatyar would each go on to lead the fundamentalist revolt against the Afghan 
constitutional monarchy, then the Afghan communists, and finally against the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan.  Eventually, each of them would govern entire mini-states, but none of them 
could ever quite manage to bring all of Afghanistan under his faction’s control.111 
Socialist and Communist Dictatorship  
¶27 Despite Afghanistan’s slow but steady progress in promoting democratic input and 
women’s rights under Zahir Shah, Afghan leftists demanded immediate and sweeping change.  
But the socialist and communist ideology to which they turned sparked implacable opposition in 
Afghanistan’s conservative religious leaders, setting the stage for the decades-long struggle 
between Soviet-backed leftist governments and Pakistani-based fundamentalist jihadi fighters   
¶28 With extremists organizing feverishly, the Afghan economy entered a tailspin in the early 
1970s.  Government corruption and a three-year drought from 1969 to 1972 brought on a famine 
that killed between 100,000 and 500,000 Afghans.112  The Afghan famine provided an opening 
for former Prime Minister Daoud, still popular with the Afghan military,113 to overthrow the 
monarchy in 1973.114  Young officers trained in the Soviet Union executed the coup.115  
Afghanistan became a republic, and Daoud its first President.116  Half of his cabinet ministers in 
were communists allied with the Parcham faction of the PDPA led by Babruk Karmal, and 
hundreds more communists entered government ministries and provincial officialdom.117 
¶29 Daoud saw the fundamentalists as the greatest threat to a modern Afghanistan, so he 
arrested Professor Niazi and 200 other fundamentalist plotters in Kabul.118  By one account, this 
action began the war between leftists and fundamentalists that continued for almost 20 years, 
until the near-obliteration of the leftists and the communist movement after the dissolution of the 
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Soviet Union and the mujahideen victory in 1992.119  The fundamentalists who had fled to 
Pakistan from Daoud’s mass arrests, including Rabbani and Hekmatyar, helped organized a holy 
war against Daoud’s regime from their new base in Pakistan.120  The most successful operation 
was an incursion from Pakistan into Afghanistan’s Panjshir valley led by Ahmed Shah Massoud, 
who would become one of Rabbani’s best commanders.121  The revolution failed, however, and 
the fundamentalist movement splintered into factions led by Rabbani and Hekmatyar.122   
¶30 The 1977 constitution granted President Daoud near-absolute powers, a common theme 
among Afghan regimes following the fall of the monarchy.123  It was otherwise a profoundly 
leftist document, contemplating dramatic economic and judicial reforms.124  All laws contrary to 
the “basic principles” of the religion of Islam remained unconstitutional,125 and judges in the 
Afghan courts would decide cases before them not governed by statutory law according to 
Hanafi law.126  But for the first time in Afghan history, the country’s constitution specifically 
stated that “women and men,” and not simply all Afghan “subjects” or “people,” were entitled to 
equality before the law and protection against discrimination.127  A unicameral legislature elected 
by all Afghans over the age of 18, half of which would be reserved for farmers and the working 
class, would draft legislation.128   
¶31 The 1977 constitution was never truly implemented, because even as it was being 
prepared, the Soviet Union became concerned that Daoud was being drawn into a pro-American 
stance with Saudi money, and began pressuring the divided Afghan communists to unite to 
overthrow him, which they did.129  When Daoud issued an order for his communist opponents to 
be arrested, it triggered a revolution.130   
¶32 During its long reign, and despite massive foreign aid, the monarchy had done little to 
improve Afghanistan’s standing as one of the poorest, least healthy, and worst educated 
countries in the world.  In the late 1970s, even after some of Daoud’s reforms, 50% of Afghan 
children died before reaching the age of five, 80% of Afghan children received no education, and 
“the per capita income, at $157, was one of the lowest in the world.”131   
¶33 In April 1978, communist military officers turned Afghanistan’s air force and tanks against 
the Daoud regime.132  The air force bombed the presidential palace, killing President Daoud and 
many members of his family.133  The first decree of the leaders of the revolution bestowed 
ultimate authority on the head of the PDPA, Nur Muhammed Taraki.134  Another decree gave 
men and women equal rights, prohibited forced marriages, established a minimum marriageable 
age of 16 for girls, and reduced the bride price to a low fixed minimum amount to discourage the 
widespread sale of young Afghan girls by their parents.135  “The Government called for women 
to enjoy freedom, to dress as they please, work in the civil service, armed forces and other 
institutions and enjoy other equal rights.”136  Taraki’s regime introduced universal education for 
boys and girls and a campaign against illiteracy, and enacted a “far-reaching redistribution of 
land” from large landlords to peasants.137 
¶34 President Taraki’s government rapidly lost control of the country to anti-regime forces, 
which in early 1979 led several Afghan provinces in open rebellion, including Nuristan and 
Hazarajat.138  Iranian fundamentalists, fresh from establishing the Iranian theocracy under 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, inspired a revolt in the large Afghan city of Herat close to the 
Iranian border,139 drawing on outrage there against the government’s efforts to promote Afghan 
women’s literacy.140  An army officer named Ismail Khan organized a mutiny of the Afghan 
armed forces in the Herat area.141  In response, the government bombed the city and waged a 
devastating assault with tanks and helicopters, killing up to 20,000 people and razing many 
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buildings.142  These events prompted Prime Minister Amin, who had gained influence over the 
Afghan security services, to seize power, killing his former comrade Taraki.143   
¶35 In July 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed a National Security Directive authorizing 
secret American aid to the Pakistan-based rebellion against the Afghan government.144  President 
Carter’s National Security Adviser advised him at the time that this aid would likely result in a 
Soviet invasion, and later boasted of “drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.”145  On 
December 27, 1979, Soviet forces in and around Kabul captured the main government ministries, 
neutralized key Afghan army units, and fanned out to other major Afghan cities such as Herat 
and Kandahar.146  Soon the Soviet occupying army reached 85,000 men.147  Before the Red 
Army’s defeat almost another 700,000 men would follow.148 
¶36 The Soviets installed PDPA founder Babruk Karmal as President of Afghanistan.  Karmal 
promulgated a new constitution in 1980 that purported to establish the rule of the Afghan people 
and recognize a similar list of individual rights as those recognized in previous constitutions.149  
The constitution no longer enshrined Islam as a bulwark of the government’s legitimacy.150  All 
political parties other than the PDPA were outlawed.151  With the Red Army occupying the nerve 
centers of Afghan society, moreover, the Soviet leadership, rather than the PDPA or the Afghan 
people, was the real power in Afghanistan during the 1980s.152   
¶37 Karmal and his Soviet handlers reaffirmed and expanded the efforts of Daoud and Taraki 
regimes before them to promote greater equality for Afghan women.  The communists “officially 
sanctioned a wider public role for women, whose status improved.”153  By 1985, 65% of the 
students at Kabul University were women, and Afghan women worked in most government 
agencies, social organizations, factories, the national airline, and the health care sector. 154  By 
the time the communists lost power, “women accounted for 70 percent of teachers, 50 percent of 
government workers, and 40 percent of medical doctors.”155  Women worked as police officers, 
members of the military, and journalists.156  Afghan women increasingly appeared unveiled in 
public, as their counterparts in Soviet Central Asia had done decades previously.157  Communist 
reforms intruded into Afghan family life when the communists banned the purchase and sale of 
young girls as wives, and provoked rage by demanding that fathers allow their daughters to learn 
to read.158  The regime’s family courts were “mostly presided over by female judges” and 
protected women’s rights in marriage and divorce and to equitable child custody and support.159   
¶38 Whatever hope existed for true equality between Afghan women and men, rich and poor, 
was lost in the genocidal war between Soviet and Afghan communist forces and the 
fundamentalist insurgents backed by the Western and wider Islamic worlds.160  Both sides 
abandoned laws and constitutions in a common descent into wanton violations of human rights.  
¶39 U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq directed billions in 
American military aid for the mujahideen, mostly to “the more extreme Sunni fundamentalist 
faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.”161  Hekmatyar used the money to organize a tightly 
disciplined faction for the day when he would “impose an authoritarian Islamic state that would 
sequester women and punish Moslems who don’t practice their faith.”162  With great violence, 
his party forced Afghan women refugees in Pakistan to bury themselves in burqas.163  Several 
Afghan women were murdered in Pakistan simply for failing to cover their hair.164   
¶40 Saudi Arabia favored the armies of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,165 whose party “recruited 
thousands of fighters from Arab countries.”166  Like Hetmatyar, Sayyaf had little indigenous 
support in Afghanistan, but grew powerful because of the prolific Saudi money and foreign 
weaponry at its disposal.167  In 1980, Sayyaf recruited a number of “Afghan Arabs” to the 
Afghan cause,168 including Osama bin Laden, who was working with the CIA at the time.169  The 
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CIA supported Pakistani efforts to “recruit radical Muslims from around the world” to fight in 
Afghanistan.170  Over 35,000 radicals from Muslim countries, mostly Arabs, signed up to fight in 
the “holy war,”171 and 65,000 had “direct contact” with the war.172  Over 12,000 Arabs and 
others received training in “bomb-making, sabotage and urban guerrilla warfare” in camps the 
CIA helped build.173  These Arab fighters would develop into the al Qaeda terrorist organization 
and become the military backbone of the Taliban movement.174 
¶41 By 1987, the communists and fundamentalists had killed more than one million Afghans 
by some estimates,175 and had driven another seven million from their homes.176  The Soviets 
carpet bombed major Afghan cities such as Herat and Kandahar into ruins, wiped half of 
Afghanistan’s villages off the map, and destroyed much of the country’s farmland.177  
Nevertheless, the Afghan resistance continually replenished its dead with new recruits from the 
millions of refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and armed them with fresh infusions of American and 
Saudi aid.178  The mujahideen gained control of up to 90% of the countryside and became 
“immensely wealthy” by making it the world’s second largest opium producing land.179   
¶42 Although the scale of the bombing and shelling of Afghan cities and towns posed the 
greatest threat to human rights, the mujahideen’s fundamentalist policies promised to overturn 
decades of progress towards including Afghan women in public life.  During the 1980s, women 
rarely walked the streets in rebel-controlled regions of Afghanistan.180  “Those who leave their 
homes wear the chador [or burqa], a voluminous shroud covering the wearer from head to toe, 
and may only survey the world through a 4-by-4-inch rectangle of netting extending from the tip 
of the nose to the eyebrows.”181  In Pakistani refugee camps run by the rebels, women were 
denied access to areas containing men, and prohibiting from seeing male doctors.182  (When the 
Taliban continued these policies, the U.S. cited them to help justify the war.183) 
¶43 In 1987, the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to withdraw entirely from 
Afghanistan.184  The Soviets planned to leave the country to Najib Allah, the former head of the 
Afghan secret police, who had taken over from Karmal as the Afghan communist leader in 
1986.185  Najib Allah convened a Loya Jirga in 1987 to signal the moderation of the communist 
regime’s policies.  The 1987 constitution it passed once again enshrined Islam as the sacred 
religion of Afghanistan and provided that no law could be contrary to its “principles” and the 
other values in the constitution.186  It guaranteed equal rights to men and women and among 
religious minorities in a similar manner to previous constitutions,187 and provided for a number 
of individual rights to be defined in accordance with the law.188  The ruling communist PDPA 
party lost its majority of seats in parliament after elections held in 1988 pursuant to the new 
constitution, and a member of Daoud’s pre-communist government became Prime Minister.189  
Najib Allah even reserved seats in parliament for mujahideen leaders, and invited them to lay 
down their arms and participate in a mixed government, an offer that they refused.190  
¶44 The Soviets completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.191  The day after the 
last troops had returned, Gorbachev proposed a cease-fire between the communists and 
fundamentalist parties to U.S. President George H.W. Bush, with the two superpowers agreeing 
to halt shipments of weapons until democratic elections under U.N. supervision could be held.192  
The Bush administration and the Afghan rebels refused to negotiate, with the result that for 
years, the mujahideen supplied by the U.S. continued devastating rocket attacks on Afghan 
towns and cities, killing up to 40 people in each blast.193 
¶45 Nevertheless, the Afghan communist regime of Najib Allah survived, sustained by a 
combination of rebel infighting and billions of dollars in Soviet military aid.194  Najib Allah 
convened a Loya Jirga in 1990, promising to achieve national reconciliation and moderate the 
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communist face of the Afghan government.  The resulting 1990 constitution proclaimed 
Afghanistan a multi-party state to be governed according to laws in conformity with the 
principles of Islam, including the right to own and inherit property pursuant to Sharia law.195  
The commanding heights of the economy remained state property, but private investment was 
allowed, at least in theory.196  The National Assembly, selected by a mixture of direct elections 
and appointments as under previous constitutions, approved laws prior to the President’s 
signature,197 with a Constitutional Commission exercising limited review.198   
Fundamentalist Rule 
¶46 As many had predicted, the victory of the Afghan rebels brought civil war, fundamentalist 
outrages, and thousands of atrocities against civilians.  The “Islamic revolution” triumphed in 
Kabul in April 1992.199  The military defense of Kabul unraveled due to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 and the defection of Afghan communist military commander Rashid 
Dostum to the rebels in March of 1992.200  But after the communist regime fell, the war 
continued.  With no communists left to fight, the mujahideen leaders were left to wage a bitter 
struggle for power among themselves,201 as Najib Allah had predicted in 1990.202   
¶47 The mujahideen perpetrated frequent massacres and “indiscriminate killing,” as well as 
“rape, torture and looting.”203  Joined by General Dostum’s tanks, Hekmatyar’s forces finished 
the job of destroying Afghanistan’s housing stock and architectural heritage by rocketing the 
Afghan capital Kabul into ruins.204  Almost 20,000 Afghans were killed or injured during the 
fighting in 1993.205  In 1994, the United Nations reported that Kabul, spared the type of bombing 
to which Kandahar had been subjected by the Soviets, had become “the most destroyed city in 
Afghanistan.”206  The warring factions killed about 50,000 Kabulis207 and committed many 
“medieval atrocities.”208  
¶48 The victorious fundamentalist armies subjected Afghan women to some of the worst 
treatment in Afghan history.209  The State Department reported that the mujaheddin were 
responsible for “innumerable cases of rape.”210  Human Rights Watch described 1992-1995 as 
the worst period in Afghan history, replete with “mass rapes” and the indiscriminate slaughter of 
civilians.211  Mujahideen fighters kidnapped many Afghan women for purposes of sexual 
slavery, as a “method of intimidating vanquished populations and of rewarding soldiers.” 212   
¶49 While the soldiers of the victorious rebel armies ran wild, discipline was reserved for 
Afghan women.  In 1994, the Supreme Court of the Islamic state of Afghanistan issued a series 
of rulings requiring a woman to “wear a full-body veil”213 and stating that she “must not leave 
her house without her husband’s permission,” and “must not look at strangers.”214  Other courts 
issued rulings ordering that women be stoned to death for adultery or other crimes.215   
¶50 The “valiant and courageous Afghan freedom fighters”216 also persecuted religious 
minorities viciously.217  On February 11 1993, the military forces of President Burhanuddin 
Rabbani and his ally Abdul Rasul Sayyaf occupied a Kabul suburb populated largely with 
minority Shia Hazaras.  Their armies killed “‘up to 1,000 civilians’, beheading old men, women, 
children and even their dogs, stuffing their bodies down the wells.”218   
¶51 Finally, Afghanistan under mujahideen rule became known for training and harboring 
international terrorists.  Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, had fought under the command of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the junior partner in Rabbani’s 
mujahideen government.219  The U.S. government issued a report in the 1990s in which it cited 
Saudi-backed mujahideen commander Sayyaf for “continuing to harbor and train potential 
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terrorists.”220  Sayyaf’s faction maintained close contact throughout the 1990s with Osama bin 
Laden, and welcomed him back to Afghanistan in 1996.221   
RISE AND FALL OF THE TALIBAN THEOCRACY 
The Atrocities and Tyranny of the Taliban   
¶52 Almost three years after the fall of the communist government, the mujahideen had failed 
to establish an effective central government or national judicial system.222  Instead of 
establishing law and order, their forces were killing, raping, and looting at will, and had “blocked 
food and medical supplies desperately needed by [the Afghan] people.”223  An estimated 100,000 
Afghans died in Kabul alone prior to the Taliban takeover in 1996.224  All told, about 400,000 
Afghan civilians died in the civil wars and humanitarian disasters of the 1990s.225   
¶53   In early 1994, according to their own legend, a group of former mujahideen fighters and 
Islamic students, or Taliban, joined together to fight the “Muslims who had gone wrong,” and 
started by freeing young boys and girls from local warlords who had kidnapped them for rape.226  
As the future President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, testified before Congress, the “Taliban 
emerged when Afghans were desperately looking for a savior,” and their “emergence was 
supported by the majority of the Afghan people” who hoped that they would “end the 
bloodshed” and bring “peace and stability.”227  The Taliban selected Muhammed Omar as their 
leader, a village mullah from a backward area of southern Afghanistan who had fought in the 
American-backed jihad against the post-Soviet Afghan government of Najib Allah.228   
¶54  The U.S. and its allies in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia initially supported the Taliban 
movement.229  Their critical military, financial, and diplomatic aid to the Taliban transformed a 
ragtag gang of fighters into a sophisticated army with tanks, artillery, bombers, and an 
intelligence capability.230  With fresh infusions of foreign financing and manpower for each new 
offensive, the Taliban defeated every major mujahideen commander.  The Taliban captured 
Kandahar in 1994 largely by bribing local commanders with over $1.5 million probably provided 
by Saudi Arabia via Pakistan.231  They doled out more cash to buy control of Uruzgan and Zabul 
provinces,232 and occupied Herat with tens of thousands of Pakistani recruits and “arms, 
ammunition, and vehicles provided by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.”233  In 1996, Saudi and 
Pakistani intelligence orchestrated the triumph of the Taliban revolution by helping ensure the 
fall of Kabul and Jalalabad.234  As many as 8,000 more residents of Kabul died in the fighting 
and the ensuing Taliban atrocities.235  In response, many of the mujahideen leaders whose 
factions had opened the way for the Taliban revolution by abusing the Afghan population for 
years formed the Northern Alliance.236  But angered by the looting and routine violence against 
civilians that had characterized mujahideen rule, some Kabul residents initially welcomed the 
Taliban, even after thousands of Kabulis died in the battle for the city.237   
¶55 The Taliban persecuted the Shia Muslims, who then made up as much as 20% of the 
Afghan population, even more brutally than had the mujahideen under Rabbani and Sayyaf.238  A 
mutiny in Mazari-Sharif opened the door to Taliban occupation of that city; although 3,000 
Taliban died in an uprising that followed, the Taliban retook the city in 1998, backed by 
Pakistani intelligence officers and even Pakistani troops.239  The victorious Taliban slaughtered 
up to 8,000 civilians in a frenzy of killing and rape directly mostly at the Shia Hazara.240  The 
Hazara holdout of Bamiyan was the last major city to fall, with more mass murders of Shias the 
result, including of hospital patients roused from their beds.241  The post-Taliban governor of 
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Bamiyan has estimated that 20,000 Shias and others died in this way.242  Iran mobilized its army 
to intervene against the massacres and systematic rape of Shias, but backed down under pressure 
from the U.N. Security Council.243  The genocidal killing continued into 2001, as Pakistan 
continued to deliver military aid to the Taliban in violation of U.N. sanctions.244   
¶56 The Taliban aimed to install a government and legal system that would revive a life like 
pious Muslims had lived “1,400 years ago.”245  The Attorney General of the Taliban declared: 
“The Constitution is the Sharia so we don’t need a constitution.”246  The Taliban believed that 
the principal purpose of the anti-Soviet jihad had been the establishment of Sharia law,247 and 
indeed that is how the mujahideen leaders who had been fighting for Sharia from bases in 
Pakistan even prior to the communist coup in 1978 explained their war at the time.248 
¶57 Saudi Arabia, the primary backer of the Taliban along with Pakistan, served as the model 
for the Taliban state.249  Saudi Arabia is a fundamentalist monarchy, whose constitution demands 
allegiance to its founding King and his “children’s children” in the name of religion.250  Its 
government tortures members of religious minorities and its religious police administer beatings 
to women who reveal their faces, hair, or bodies in public.251  The Saudi government helped 
create the Taliban, encouraged them to give refuge to bin Laden, and tutored them in 
theocracy.252  The Saudi Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice 
trained a similar Taliban agency in enforcing Saudi-style laws, including the near-total covering 
of women.253   
¶58 The resulting system of Taliban law involved severe criminal sanctions, enforced with 
great capriciousness and corruption, against any activities viewed as sinful or otherwise harmful.  
The Taliban’s prohibitions addressed activities prohibited by religious tradition as harmful to the 
person (drugs and alcohol, gambling, and usury); sexuality and Western fashions (music and 
dancing, British or American hairstyles, the shaving of men’s beards, women’s high-heeled 
shoes, and fashion magazines); “idolatry” (photographs, paintings, statues, and sorcery); and 
other relatively harmless activities that might lead to gambling or distract from prayer 
(television, sports, kite-flying and the keeping of birds as pets).254  Proving the old adage that the 
law often falls behind advances in technology, however, the Taliban did not prohibit use of the 
Internet until July 2001, half a decade after banning kite-flying in 1996.255   
¶59 The mode of enforcement of the Taliban’s prohibitions proved as uncompromising as the 
bans themselves.  Torture by various methods was routine and vicious under the Taliban.256  
Violations of the Taliban dress code and inappropriate male-female contact were cause for being 
beaten black and blue with clubs or rifle butts.257  Implementing Taliban law required stoning 
adulterers and amputating the hands of criminals, medieval punishments which had been 
abandoned by most Muslim countries.258     
¶60 While Afghan men suffered conscription into the Taliban army,259 bitter fighting in the 
north of the country,260 imprisonment or murder for their religious or political affiliation,261 and 
denial of virtually any access to entertainment or unrelated members of the opposite sex, they 
enjoyed some ability to go to school, find a job, and travel.  The Taliban kept Afghan women, by 
contrast, largely shuttered indoors.262  Upon taking power in Kandahar in 1994, the Taliban 
forbade the education of girls and the employment of most women outside of their homes.263  
After becoming the rulers of most of Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban’s religious police decreed 
that women must wear all-covering burqas, which many Afghan women could not even afford 
(as they cost about two months’ wages), effectively sentencing them to house arrest.264  The 
Taliban ordered women to stay in their homes as much as possible, ended the rudimentary 
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female education and employment that the mujahideen had allowed to continue,265 and allowed 
women to see only female doctors, while banning women from practicing medicine.266   
Building a New Afghan Government 
¶61 The Bush administration, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
demanded that the Taliban cease harboring Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist 
organization, and threatened war and the destruction of their government if they refused.  But the 
Taliban declined to hand over bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist leader and mujahideen fighter 
suspected of masterminding or inspiring the 9/11 attacks; bin Laden had contributed about $100 
million to the Taliban by that time.267  A Taliban spokesman, however, indicated that the regime 
would hand bin Laden over for trial, provided that the U.S. provided evidence of his 
responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, which the U.S. had provided only to its “key allies.”268   
¶62 On October 7, 2001, the U.S. began bombing al Qaeda terrorist targets and Afghan 
military, electricity, and communications facilities.269  Special forces units on the ground 
provided the targeting coordinates for U.S. aerial bombing, which destroyed the Taliban tanks 
and troops that had held off the Northern Alliance opposition for years.270  Hundreds of Taliban 
conscripts and hardcore troops died in the fighting, including many prisoners of war summarily 
executed by Northern Alliance gunfire or suffocation in sealed truck containers.271  Thousands of 
Afghan civilians died in the U.S. bombing raids and the ground operations that mopped up after 
them.272  Whole families were cut down, sometimes as a result of apparently indiscriminate 
bombing based on innacurate or misleading information.273 
¶63  Driving the Taliban before them, the luminaries of the anti-Soviet jihad retook their 
former positions in Herat,274 Bamiyan,275 and Kandahar,276 the prize of Kabul going to the forces 
of former President Rabbani, now led by Ahmed Shah Massoud’s successor Muhammad 
Fahim.277  Former mujahideen deputy foreign minister Hamid Karzai, leader of the largest 
Pashtun tribe, entered Afghanistan after September 11 to raise a Pashtun rebellion against the 
Taliban, joining Gul Agha Shirzai in taking Kandahar.278   
¶64  The occupation of Kabul by the Northern Alliance created a political crisis for the U.S. 
and the U.N., which had urged their forces to hold back from taking the city until a broad-based 
government could be formed.  Under pressure from the U.S. and other nations, Northern Alliance 
commanders and other Afghan military factions agreed to participate in U.N.-sponsored talks 
held in Bonn, Germany.  Almost two dozen Afghan delegates, mostly drawn from the Northern 
Alliance and the circle around former King Zahir Shah, signed an accord called for the creation 
of an Interim Authority to rule Afghanistan until a Transitional Authority government could be 
selected in a Loya Jirga six months later, and a “fully representative government” freely elected 
two years after that.279  Although loyalists to the former King Zahir Shah initially voted that he 
return to power, the U.S. and U.N. secured the delegates’ agreement to appoint Pashtun anti-
Taliban leader Hamid Karzai as Chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority.280   
¶65 Over 1,000 elected and 700 selected delegates to the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga 
established the Islamic Transitional Authority of Afghanistan281 and elected Hamid Karzai as its 
President.282  Despite the support of a majority of delegates at one point, the former King of 
Afghanistan Mohammad Zahir Shah withdrew his name from consideration for the presidency, 
prompting Human Rights Watch to accuse the U.S. of “‘brazen’ interference in the loya jirga, 
[which was] promoted as the birth of Afghani democracy.”283  Some delegates also objected that 
mujahideen commanders who had killed innocent Afghan civilians were wielding too much 
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control over the Afghan political process.  “We were told that this loya jirga would not include 
all the people who had blood on their hands,” said one delegate to applause.284   
Warlord Theocracy and Human Rights Violations  
¶66 Bonn’s aspirations for government under law and with respect for human rights have yet to 
be realized throughout Afghanistan.  Of course, the Karzai administration inherited a miserable 
and barely functioning country from the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces who had 
controlled it through 2001: average life expectancy was only 40 years, 70% of Afghans were 
malnourished, more infants died in childhood and more mothers died in childbirth than in almost 
any other country ever recorded in human history, and millions of children had been orphaned in 
the various wars since 1978.285  But none of these poor health statistics can justify the sorts of 
human rights violations that have occurred in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s fall. 
¶67 The Karzai government began as “an island in a sea of uncompromising warlords” who 
field large militias outside the framework of the Afghan National Army and exercise totalitarian 
theocratic powers.286  Most rural areas and even major cities are not under the firm control of the 
central government, especially at night.287  According to a member of the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission, “trials do not take place in accordance with law. In 
provinces, warlords are the law, the judge, the government.”288   
¶68 Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a Wahhabi fundamentalist sent to Afghanistan in the 1980s by Saudi 
Arabia to promote its ideology,289 controls much of Kabul province.290  The governor of Kabul 
province and many of the city’s police and intelligence officials are loyal to him, his troops 
patrol western Kabul, and even President Karzai himself is reportedly “often forced to bow to 
[his] demands.”291  International peacekeepers in Kabul “have publicly accused … troops under 
his control of being responsible for a series of murders, abductions and extortion incidents in that 
sector of the city, aided by a cadre of loyalists in the police department.”292  Following 
mainstream Saudi ideology,293 his forces “continue to enforce strict Islamic social codes 
including restrictions on women’s education and dress.”294  Sayyaf’s forces have tortured 
villagers and old people for such crimes as listening to music.295  He views any attempt to 
question his authority as a form of blasphemy, and had two newspaper editors arrested on 
blasphemy charges and sentenced to death for criticizing his tactics.296   
¶69 The authorities in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, continue to implement the 
rural Pashtun traditions that the Taliban proclaimed to be requirements of Islam.297  Young girls 
are forced into marriage under pain of imprisonment; one received a five-year sentence for 
refusing to go along with an arranged marriage.298  The police jailed another woman for refusing 
to enter into a marriage with a man to whom she had been promised by her parents when she was 
only two years old.299  Kandahar’s post-Taliban legal officials imprisoned a woman who escaped 
after being held as a sex slave for seven years; she had been sold for about $200 during Taliban 
times to a man who raped her repeatedly.300  Because of cases like these, the head of a major 
nongovernmental organization working in Afghanistan reported that she could “see no change 
for most women” in Kandahar since the Taliban lost power.301   
¶70 In the north, a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Pashtuns has raged.  Soldiers and 
armed militia in northern Afghanistan have rounded up and shot dozens of Pashtun men at a 
time, raping many Pashtun women and young girls, a crime that can lead to the murder of its 
victim by members of her own family in conservative rural Afghanistan.302  The militia of former 
communist commander General Dostum raped whole families of women, including girls as 
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young as 10.303  A U.N. official called the abuses against ethnic Pashtuns “systematic and wide 
scale.”304  Thousands of Pashtuns fled their homes, some living in caves to keep warm.305   
¶71 For most of the past four years, a “hardline Islamist” ruled Herat, a historically more 
liberal city near the Iranian border that is widely viewed as a litmus test for human rights after 
the Taliban.306  The security forces of Governor Ismail Khan borrowed a page from neighboring 
Iran, which Khan called “the best model of an Islamic country in the world,”307 using beatings 
and torture to silence political opponents, journalists and human right activists.308  Women 
complained that his regime resembled that of the Taliban,309 as their mode of dress was confined 
to two options: burqas or full-body veils (known as chadoris) that expose only the face.310  The 
police in Herat ordered that 10 forced gynecological examinations be conducted every day to test 
the chastity of girls or women arrested on suspicion of immoral conduct.311  Although President 
Karzai promoted Ismail Khan from Governor to the Ministry of Mines in September of 2004, he 
continued to field a militia, and thousands of petty warlords with similar ideologies continue to 
hold power in their respective fiefdoms.312 
¶72 The principal engine of theocratic tendencies on a national basis has been the Afghan 
courts, the policies of which have been indistinguishable in some respects from the Taliban’s.  
As a respected religious scholar among mujahideen, Sayyaf persuaded Afghan transitional 
president Hamid Karzai to declare Afghanistan an “Islamic” state after the Loya Jirga, and to 
ensure that “Afghanistan’s justice system will be based on the Koran and Sharia law.”313  Sayyaf, 
the Northern Alliance’s “No. 2 political leader,” threatened guerilla war against the government 
if his demands were not met.314  Foremost among these demands is gender apartheid.315   
¶73 Sayyaf prevailed upon President Karzai to appoint as Chief Justice of Afghanistan’s 
Supreme Court Fazal Hadi Shinwari, a fundamentalist member of Sayyaf’s political party who is 
not even trained in Afghan constitutional or statutory law.316  Shinwari has “called for Taliban-
style punishments and brought back the Taliban’s dreaded Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue 
and Prevention of Vice,” which “deploys squads to stop public displays of ‘un-Islamic’ 
behaviour among Afghan women.”317  A list of laws and policies being enforced in Afghanistan 
reads like the Taliban’s handbook: women cannot speak in private with men, young people can 
be arrested if they marry without their parents’ consent,318 women are forbidden to travel without 
supervision of a male family member, married women are denied the ability to attend high 
school, education of women together with men is banned, and women are restrained from 
singing in public.319  Most women remain confined to their homes as many Afghan men, backed 
by the judiciary, continue to treat women “according to the old Taliban ways.”320 
¶74 Shinwari’s influence stretches far beyond the Supreme Court.  He has “appointed most of 
Afghanistan’s current judiciary -- mostly clerics in rural areas -- as well as many of the country’s 
provincial governors, especially near Kabul.”321  He used this power to appoint Afghans with 
only informal religious training and little experience to the bench, including almost 130 of his 
political allies to the Afghan Supreme Court,322 while women judges with decades of experience 
in the Afghan judiciary were denied posts.323  As a result, the Afghan courts are “dominated by 
religious conservatives who have more in common with the Taliban than with Karzai.”324 
¶75 The U.S. promised that an Afghan commission on judicial reform would rein in Mr. 
Shinwari’s theocratic excesses.  But due to the fundamentalists’ control over the political 
process, judicial reform long stood at a standstill, even backsliding into increasing control by 
extremists.325  The Judicial Reform Commission was dissolved in 2002, “reportedly obstructed 
by religious hard-liners.”326  The Supreme Court is itself violating the constitution by being 
packed with too many justices. 327  Moreover, little or nothing has been done to ensure that 
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judges are qualified, that criminal defendants have access to defense attorneys, that lawyers have 
access to books containing the laws currently in effect, or that endemic corruption ends.328  
Prison conditions are horrifying, and torture is common.329  Far from secular reformists gaining 
ground, Sayyaf himself is said to be next in line to be Afghanistan’s Chief Justice.330    
THE NEW AFGHAN CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution Drafting Process 
¶76 The Bonn agreement provided for a Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution 
for review and adoption by a Constitutional Loya Jirga to be convened by October 2003.331  
President Karzai appointed a nine-member Constitutional Drafting Commission, which included 
two women,332 and a 35-member Constitutional Review Commission, which included seven 
women.333  President Karzai appointed Vice President Nematullah Shahrani, a prominent 
conservative, to head both commissions, a signal to many that the constitution would establish a 
national religion and mandate strict religious law.334   
¶77 Past Afghan constitutions failed to ensure national unity and long-term stability, partially 
because the population as a whole felt excluded from the drafting process.335  To involve the 
Afghan people in the framing of their constitution, the Afghan government and international 
community planned to submit the draft document to a broadly representative Constitutional Loya 
Jirga, which was held in December 2003.336  In addition, the U.N. helped organize a public 
consultation process to include thousands of ordinary Afghans.337  Still, most rural Afghans 
never heard of the constitutional process underway in their country until it was already over.338 
The Ideological Battle for the Future of Afghanistan 
¶78 Given the decades-old struggle within Afghan society between secularists and 
fundamentalists, the role of religion in the new constitution was bound to be contentious.  
Fundamentalists such as Rabbani and Sayyaf used their representatives on the Constitutional 
Commission and the Supreme Court to fight for a constitutional mandate of theocracy.339  
Experts warned that these leaders wanted their “conservative interpretation of Sharia law 
incorporated into the next Afghan Constitution.”340  International human rights activists, on the 
other hand, advocated a constitution that respected religious difference and closed the door on 
the totalitarian fundamentalism that killed so many Afghans in the 1990s.  A commission of 
human rights activists and Islamic law scholars recommended that the new constitution shy away 
from mandating one man’s version of Sharia or Islam, and retain instead the flexibility of the 
1964 constitution’s requirement of governance in conformity with the “basic principles of 
Islam.”341  Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch recommended other improvements 
to the draft constitution in terms of religious freedom and due process.342   
¶79 Afghan activists also demanded strong protection for women’s rights.  Afghanistan’s 
Deputy Minister for Women’s Affairs argued for an express ban on all forms of discrimination 
against women and a clear requirement of universal education of Afghan women.343  A 
conference convened in Kandahar of women leaders from across Afghanistan went further, 
demanding an “Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights” that included equal representation in parliament 
and the Constitutional Loya Jirga, compulsory education through high school with opportunities 
for higher education, full property and inheritance rights and participation in economic life, 
access to modern health services and reproductive care, freedom to decide whom to be married 
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to, enforcement of criminal laws against violence and sexual abuse, and an end to the exchange 
of women as compensation for crimes by one family against another (known as Bad).344   
¶80 The draft constitution, unveiled to the public in early November 2003, proclaimed 
Afghanistan an Islamic state with a national religion.345  Under the draft, no law could be 
“contrary to the sacred religion of Islam,”346 Afghan judges must rule in accordance with the 
provisions of the conservative Hanafi school of jurisprudence of Sharia law,347 the justices of the 
Supreme Court must swear to rule in accord with the “provisions” of religion, the President must 
swear an oath to safeguard religion, and the nation’s educational curriculum would be religious 
in nature.348  These articles represented a significant departure from the 1964 constitution, which 
required Afghan law to be consistent merely with the general “principles” of Islam rather than a 
government official’s view of what the “religion” itself provides.349  Under the new draft, 
“anything that is against Islam could not go forward,” because conservatives forces were 
empowered to “say virtually whatever they want is against Islam.”350   
¶81 The draft constitution’s almost complete silence on women’s rights proved to be its most 
disappointing and even embittering flaw in the eyes of many activists for women’s rights and the 
rule of law.  The draft guaranteed women almost 17% of the seats in the Afghan Senate,351 but it 
did not explicitly guarantee women equal rights with men or prohibit discrimination against 
women, even though similar provisions are contained in several constitutions of majority Islamic 
countries in the Middle East, the Central Asian former Soviet republics, and South Asia.352  Nor 
did it provide Afghan women with rights of equal access to employment, education, and health 
care, or with any protections against forced marriages, family violence, and sexual abuse.353  
Instead it provided all Afghan “citizens” with equal rights and protection against 
discrimination,354 without stating clearly that women are citizens.355  For these reasons, a Gender 
and Law Working Group convened by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs prepared a number of 
recommended amendments to the draft constitution, including an anti-discrimination clause, 
guarantees of equal rights and full citizenship for women; an end to forced marriages and 
trafficking in women; and a provision outlawing slavery and “slave-like practices.”356 
The Afghan Constitution: Freedom or Theocracy? 
¶82 On January 4, 2004, the 1,500 Afghan delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) 
ratified the new constitution.  The changes to the initial draft reflected a series of hard-fought 
compromises negotiated among several factions and hundreds of individuals.  World leaders, 
including the President of Afghanistan, the representative of U.N. Secretary-General to 
Afghanistan, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the U.S. President, immediately hailed 
the new constitution as a triumph for human rights.  President Karzai called it “the most 
enlightened in that part of the world.”357  The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan praised the 
document as “one of the most enlightened constitutions in the Islamic world.”358   
¶83 The Afghans who participated in the constitutional drafting process, and the international 
community, crafted a charter for their country that stands as an unqualified improvement over 
the Taliban’s unwritten code of theocratic oppression.  Among other improvements, the 
constitution remedied the draft’s failure to enshrine women’s rights.  It now provides that: “Any 
kind of discrimination and privilege between the citizens of Afghanistan are prohibited.  [¶]  The 
citizens of Afghanistan – whether man or woman – have equal rights and duties before the 
law.”359  This clause revives precedents in the 1977 and 1987 constitutions that specifically 
guaranteed that Afghan women would enjoy equal rights before the law and protection against 
discrimination.360  Moreover, the new constitution envisions a level of participation by Afghan 
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women in their country’s parliament that surpasses any historical precedent in that country, or 
indeed in most other countries.  On paper, women are guaranteed over 25% of the seats in the 
lower house of parliament, and almost 17% of the upper house.361   
¶84 But a close examination of the tight relationship the constitution establishes between 
religious doctrine and the judiciary reveals that the claim that the new constitution is the most 
“enlightened” in the region, even in the entire Islamic world, is implausible.  Although women 
are equal “before the law,” the intention of the Afghan courts and many of the constitution’s 
drafters is that the laws will treat them very differently in many respects, and deny them many 
liberties available to men.  And while they may be ensured a say in parliament, their ability to 
pass laws improving women’s plight in their country will be strictly limited by a veto power the 
constitution grants to radical fundamentalists in the Afghan judiciary.  The constitution also 
omits elementary protections available to women in other countries where they have not been 
subjected to the kind of treatment suffered in Afghanistan for many years, such as a ban on 
slavery and slave-like practices, or a requirement that both parties consent to a marriage.362   
¶85 Many Afghans and international human rights groups have accordingly tempered their 
praise of the constitution.  They have expressed fears that several provisions could be used to 
enforce medieval interpretations of Islamic Sharia law, suppress religious expression and 
political speech, and perpetuate Afghan laws and customs that ruthlessly oppress Afghan 
women.  An agenda to accommodate a fundamentalist future for Afghanistan permeated the CLJ, 
and prevented the new constitution from realizing the promises of the U.S. and U.N. that 
Afghanistan would henceforth abide by international human rights standards.  The warlords and 
fundamentalist leaders, who issued death threats against more moderate Afghan men and women 
to deter them from participating in or even attending the CLJ, prevailed on several critical issues 
that the assembly addressed.363   Their death threats and vote buying ensured that the “majority” 
of CLJ delegates were tied to the “warlord controlling the province they came from.”364  Nor did 
the intimidation end at the doors of the CLJ.  The chairman of the CLJ, a former mujahideen 
leader, announced that female delegates should not “try to put yourself on a level with men.  
Even God has not given you equal rights, … because under his decision two women are counted 
as equal to one man.”365  The chairman called for delegates who circulated a petition proposing 
the removal of the word “Islamic” from the name of the country to be “identified and punished” 
as infidels, an offense worthy of the death penalty during Afghanistan’s recent history.366   
¶86 At the CLJ, the warlords that have ruled most of Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban 
succeeded in transforming a clause providing that no law could be contrary to the religion of 
Islam “and the values of this Constitution” into one that says that “no law can be contrary to the 
beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.”367  Afghan experts and human rights 
activists regard the new clause as much more subject to abuse by fundamentalists who seek to 
impose Taliban-like theocratic rule, because the “provisions” of Islam were precisely what the 
Taliban claimed to be enforcing.  Female CLJ delegates and human rights activists therefore 
view this provision as introducing a strict version of Sharia law by the “back door.”368  The 
“beliefs and provisions” clause means “that Islamic law is the supreme law of the land,” and its 
content will inevitably be left for a Supreme Court staffed by “hard line Shariah jurists” to 
interpret.369  Under the new constitution, the Supreme Court, whose Chief Justice has 
consistently pushed for a theocratic state in which his interpretation of Islam would hold sway,370 
“can review compliance with the Constitution of laws, legislative decrees, international treaties, 
and international conventions, and interpret them, in accordance with the law.”371  The 
constitution grants the Supreme Court, which the Chief Justice has packed with many 
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sympathetic judges who lack training in Afghanistan’s civil and secular laws, the “power to 
reject virtually any law or treaty as un-Islamic.”372   
¶87 While failing in some respects to adequately protect human rights, the new constitution 
doesn’t do enough to prohibit Taliban and other war criminals from keeping or winning 
government posts, and using them to impose fundamentalist rule.  Such efforts had precedents in 
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,373 and would be revived in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.  The 
new constitution bars only those actually “convicted” of crimes against humanity from becoming 
President, a Minister, or member of the National Assembly or Supreme Court.374  The 
ineffectiveness of this provision results from the fact that despite “the enormous scale of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations committed in 
Afghanistan, … no one has yet been tried by a competent court for crimes committed during the 
long years of conflict in the country.”375  Rather than convening trials, in late 2003 coalition 
forces “released the Taliban’s foreign minister from custody, and prominent Afghan officials … 
invited him and other Taliban to run for office in the upcoming elections, something that millions 
of Afghan women are still too afraid to do.”376  After the Karzai government took office, “many 
former Taliban officials [were] sitting in the same government positions they held when Mullah 
Mohammad Omar was still in charge.”377  Other Taliban officials have been wooed with “‘the 
offer of a place in the government.’”378  Amnesty International thus declared the constitution’s 
efforts to deny power to war criminals “meaningless.”379    
¶88 In several other respects, implementation of the rights guaranteed in the constitution seems 
a distant dream.  Shortly after the new constitution was adopted, U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan’s special envoy to Afghanistan warned that “there is no rule of law in this country yet.”380  
The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission received complaints of hundreds of 
murders in 2003, most blamed on government officials and militia commanders.381  The 
Commission has found that “innocent people are put in jail for a very long time and for no 
reason.”382  There is no sign of these practices having been put to an end by the adoption of the 
new constitution.383     
TEST CASES FOR THEOCRACY UNDER THE SIXTH AFGHAN CONSTITUTION 
¶89 Theocracy is a recurring problem in human history because the corruption and 
depredations of government by mere men make their countrymen long for a morally infallible 
ruler.  But when political leaders use their military power to promote their own intolerant beliefs, 
the result has often been mass slaughter and widespread atrocities against members of other 
faiths, as occurred in the Crusades,384 counter-Reformation Europe,385 the European colonies of 
the New World386 and Africa,387 the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I,388 post-
colonial India and Pakistan,389 and Sudan since 1989.390  But even mass killings have failed to 
preserve many theocracies from persistent rebellions led by subjects who chafe under the human 
rulers’ arrogant misrepresentation of their own narrow views as the mandate of heaven.   
¶90  In the same way, the Taliban, and before them the fundamentalists among the 
mujahideen, forced Shia Muslim Afghans and secularists either to suffer repression or to take up 
arms against their rulers, which massacred them in return.  In the near future, Afghans may be 
driven into a similar bind by theocratic policies promulgated under cover of constitutional 
legitimacy.  Whether this happens may depend on the success of the warlords and the 
fundamentalists who dominate the Afghan judiciary in imposing fundamentalist policies that are 
as damaging to human rights as those that provoke so much opposition in neighboring Iran that 
mass killings and systematic torture have been deemed necessary to quell it.    
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Outlawing Secular Political Parties 
¶91  A significant challenge to Afghans, especially women, seeking to implement their right to 
participate in parliamentary elections will be possible legal restrictions that could be used to 
silence political parties represent ethnic or religious minorities, secularists, or women.  The new 
constitution bans political parties whose aims are “contrary to the principles of [the] sacred 
religion of Islam,” as well as those that primarily appeal to members of an underrepresented 
ethnic, linguistic or religious group.391  Afghan authorities understand the “principles” of Islam 
to include precepts of Sharia law “agreed upon by the major schools of jurisprudence (fiqh)”; as 
a result, any political party that “calls for full equality before the law of women and men could 
by this reasoning be defined as contrary to Islamic principles.”392  A key test case for the 
constitution will therefore be whether the political parties clause will be misused in this way.  
Curtailing Political Debate 
¶92 Another important test of the Afghan constitution’s ability to provide for peaceful and 
democratic change will be whether it protects freedom of speech and debate.  The new 
constitution restricts free expression that intrudes upon religious sensitivities.393  A prominent 
member of Afghanistan’s Supreme Court has declared that: “In the constitution there is an article 
that says things that go against Islam are not allowed.”394  The Supreme Court has ordered two 
prominent journalists and the former Minister of Women’s Affairs to stand trial on spurious 
charges of blasphemy after they criticized Afghanistan’s warlords.395   Blasphemy is still an 
offense that is potentially subject to the death penalty under Afghan penal laws, and 
fundamentalist Afghans frequently issue death threats against people charged with it.396  The 
Supreme Court actually sentenced the two reporters to death, and a female writer was also 
sentenced to be executed, although none of these sentences has been carried out yet.397  Such 
prosecutions could represent a serious threat to the development of Afghan democracy. 
Persecuting Religious Minorities 
¶93 Particularly under the Taliban but throughout Afghan history, the country’s rulers have 
oppressed and murdered religious minorities, especially Shia Muslims among the Hazaras.  The 
new constitution provides that “[f]ollowers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and 
perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law.”398  But as with many 
other aspects of the constitution, whether and to what extent religious minorities will be 
protected depends on what the “provisions of law” limiting religious freedom may be.  The Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court has declared that: “The Islamic government, according to sharia, is 
bound to punish those who get involved in anti-Islamic activities…. We can punish them for 
propagating other religions - such as threaten them, expel them and, as a last resort, execute 
them, but only with evidence.”399  The Chief Justice believes that there are three ways to deal 
with adherents of minority religions: “One, is you politely invite him to join the Muslim faith. 
Two, if he refuses, insist that they obey the laws of Islam. And three, if he rejects that, [the Chief 
Justice] says, ‘I have no choice’ and points to the sword above his desk, and says, ‘behead 
him.’”400  The Chief Justice has also warned that anyone who preaches or describes Christianity 
to Afghans may face the death penalty.401  If these statements are translated into legal doctrine, 
the constitution’s protection of religious freedom may prove to be very weak.   
Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law  Volume 3 (Spring 2005) 
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights   
 22
Enforcing Medieval Punishments  
Stoning for Adultery   
¶94 The Chief Justice of the Afghan Supreme Court has made clear that he wants to see 
“adulterers whipped or stoned to death, the hands of robbers amputated and murderers publicly 
executed.”402  Although the Old Testament of the Bible contemplates the stoning of adulterers 
and other criminals, the Qur’an does not, and most modern states have abandoned the practice.403  
Resuming the stoning of adulterers, as a local district court did when it ordered an Afghan 
woman to be stoned to death in late April 2005, would make Afghanistan’s laws even more 
theocratic than those of neighboring Iran, which abandoned the stoning of adulterers in 2002 
after sentencing two women to be stoned to death the previous year.404  President Karzai has 
repeatedly insisted that Afghanistan will be governed by Sharia law, which many Afghans 
understand to provide for stoning in cases of adultery.405  Aides to Karzai have insisted that 
stoning will not be resumed on President Karzai’s watch, and the Constitution provides the 
President with the authority to reduce and pardon penalties, but only “in accordance with law.”406  
But Karzai does not necessarily control what goes on in all of Afghanistan, and there is no 
guarantee that Karzai will always be President to veto court-ordered stonings.  And because the 
Supreme Court is ultimately vested with the power to interpret the law and verify compliance 
with Islam, the Chief Justice may override a Karzai pardon in an emotionally or politically 
charged case.407  A renegade warlord, fundamentalist politician, or Supreme Court power grab 
could therefore return Afghanistan to the days of torturing and killing women under the pretext 
of piety.  
Amputating Hands for Theft  
¶95  The Chief Justice has pronounced that “a hand being chopped for theft” is necessary for 
“obvious and justified reasons - ridding society of crime.”408  Even President Karzai has 
expressed qualified support for the idea, noting that there are “strict rules” governing such 
punishments and it “is extremely, extremely difficult in the real interpretation of Sharia to cut off 
somebody’s hand. The hand-cutting part is only applicable, only applicable, if the society has 
been provided with all the means of work and earning and making a life.”409  This is somewhat 
reassuring, at least in those cases where President Karzai remains in control and convinced that 
“all the means of work” were not available to a defendant.  But warlords, the Supreme Court, and 
future presidents may not be so gentle.  Although amputation may seem preferable to some 
compared to life imprisonment under constant threat of rape, the sentence meted out to petty 
thieves in the U.S. under some circumstances,410 its revival would raise serious questions about 
Afghanistan’s compliance with its international treaty obligations.411 
Discriminating Against Women 
¶96 Virtually every world religion elevates men to the position of lordship over women, 
placing most forms of religious fundamentalism on a collision course with equal rights and full 
participation by all citizens in a democratic government.412  Like their fundamentalist 
counterparts in other nations, many powerful leaders in post-Taliban Afghanistan have a record 
of holding Afghan women to a far higher standard of pious conduct than men are expected to 
obey.  Afghan women must shoulder most of the burden of preventing lust and extramarital sex, 
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by donning burqas and denying themselves access to most public spaces.413  They must submit 
to marriages against their will and not of their choosing, even under circumstances in which men 
would be free to refuse.  The continuation of such practices will prove all the promises of equal 
rights for Afghan women before the law to be illusory.  
The Burqa and Forced Covering 
¶97 All of us remember how the U.S. condemned the burqa as the ultimate symbol of the 
oppression of women under the Taliban and the terrorists’ ideology of “hate.”  A State 
Department press release issued during the Afghan war called the burqa an “infamous and 
intolerable” form of torturing and imprisoning women in a “voluminous, tent-like full-body outer 
garment that covers [women] from head to toe.”414  Despite all the pain and discomfort it may 
cause, the allies of the U.S. in Afghanistan are still requiring women under their power to wear 
the burqa.  Although American television gleefully reported that Afghan women had thrown out 
their burqas when the Taliban left,415 Afghan warlords are still requiring them to wear it.416  
Most women still wear the burqa, not so much out of fidelity to their religious faith and the 
requirements of the Qur’an – which does not even mention veils, let alone burqas – but because 
they are forced to do so by the dictate of local warlords or the fear of marauding militiamen.417  
“In post-Taliban Afghanistan, women have been raped for daring to think they could now go 
without the burqa.”418  Future Afghan governments will decide whether the burqa is part of the 
“beliefs and provisions of Islam,” or on the contrary is incompatible not only with Islam but with 
the international human rights treaties to which Afghanistan is a party.  The issue will likely be 
resolved by the Afghan courts, which extreme fundamentalists like Sayyaf and his allies on the 
Supreme Court look poised to control for the indefinite future.419  
Involuntary Seclusion of Women  
¶98 Women in Afghan society remain burdened by laws and practices that keep them out of the 
public sphere.  Religious leaders with no legal training act as judges, imprisoning young people 
for such crimes as dating, falling in love, or marrying without parental permission.420  A woman 
may commit a crime simply by having a conversation or being seen in public with an unrelated 
man.421  The former governor of Herat announced on radio and television that the police and 
Department of Vice and Virtue “must stop men and women who are unmarried from walking 
together on the street” and “are obliged to beat them.”422  This iron curtain of male-female 
segregation is hardly compatible with the full participation of women in a “broad-based and 
representational” government, which the U.S. has defined to include women.423 
Forced and Underage Marriage 
¶99 More than two years after the Taliban fell, Afghan women are still being denied their rights 
in marriage and to divorce under both international and Islamic law, much more often than 
women in many other Islamic countries are.  In July 2002, for example, almost 800 women per 
day applied for divorces to the judicial authorities of the Afghan government.424  But instead of 
being granted their divorces, some were imprisoned, including a dozen women subjected to 
forced marriages under the Taliban.425  The judiciary continues to apply its version of the Hanafi 
school of Islamic law to deny women the right to divorce under most circumstances, granting 
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relief from forced marriages only in “rare” cases.426  Women who run away from home without 
their husband’s permission can be sentenced to several years in prison.427   
¶100 Teenage girls are still routinely forced into marriages with men they have never met, often 
much older than they are.  About 50% of Afghanistan’s marriages are compulsory.428  Afghan 
families often sell their daughters for excessive dowries equivalent to thousands of dollars, in a 
country where the average income is about $200.429  Many young women have resorted to setting 
themselves on fire to escape this contemporary form of slavery.430  Over 100 Afghan women 
died of self-immolation in the first ten months of 2004.431  Afghanistan’s high rate of forced 
marriages is fueling this unprecedented epidemic of fiery suicides.432  Although President Karzai 
has declared that there “can’t be any worse oppression” than forced marriage, the Afghan 
government contributes to it by imprisoning girls and women married against their will, if and 
when they flee.433  Girls and women have no legal alternative to suicide, as they are arrested and 
jailed for fleeing child marriages or abusive families.434  A jailer in Kabul told a reporter that: “If 
a girl in Afghanistan runs off with a boy or tries to escape from her family, that is a crime.”435  
Moreover, Afghan tribal councils continue to resolve criminal cases “by ordering that the alleged 
perpetrator provide the family of the alleged victim with a young girl or girls, usually below the 
legal marriage age, in order to compensate for the alleged crime.”436  The girl “is then forcibly 
married to a male member of the victim’s family.”437  Thus, the Afghan criminal justice system 
“is more likely to violate the rights of women than to protect and uphold them.”438  The U.S. has 
tolerated these policies of the government and warlords it funds and helped gain power, even 
though it cited the “high rates of depression and suicide among Afghan women” as a reason to 
go to war against the Taliban.439   
¶101 International law recognizes forced marriage as a form of slavery to which Afghanistan 
must put an end if it aspires to membership in the community of civilized nations.  For example, 
a treaty that Afghanistan signed on to in 1966440 obliged States parties to abolish slave-like 
practices in which a “woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on 
payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any 
person....”441  Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that women and men 
have equal rights before, during and after marriage,442 and that “[m]arriage shall be entered into 
only with the free and full consent of the intending spouse.”443  Finally, Afghanistan’s 
international obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women are to guarantee that women have “the right to choose a spouse freely” and enjoy “the 
same rights and responsibilities in marriage and at the time of termination of marriage.”444   
¶102 Marriages of very young Afghan girls are a particularly grave problem.  Young girls are 
still routinely promised in marriage to bring in an income to a poor family, or to satisfy a 
financial or “blood” debt.445  As a consequence, many young girls are pressured into marriages in 
their early teens and even as early as seven.446  The practice is not restricted to Afghanistan, but 
is common in rural parts of India and Africa.447   
¶103 The minimum marriageable age in Afghanistan is 16 by statute.448  However, the courts 
refuse to enforce this law.449  Nearly two years after the Taliban fell, Amnesty International 
reported one case in which a court refused to take any action on a criminal complaint against a 
48 year old to whom an eight-year old girl had been forcibly married.450  This court may simply 
have been implementing government policy, for the Deputy Chief Justice of the Afghan Supreme 
Court has claimed that the “only source of legislation in Afghanistan is Islamic shariah law,”451 
which some jurists interpret to allow a “father to contract binding marriages for both his sons and 
his daughters so long as they are minors (up to the age of nine or onset of menstruation for girls 
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and puberty, up to age fifteen at the latest, for boys).”452  Although some jurists maintain that a 
girl may repudiate such a marriage upon attaining puberty by application to the court, social 
conditions tend to vitiate this right.453   
¶104 International law condemns child marriages in the same breath as other forced marriages.  
Very young girls cannot be said to give their free and full consent to a marriage as required by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.454  Theoretically, therefore, Afghan courts could 
find further support in that treaty for enforcing their domestic law against child marriages.455  But 
the new constitution’s deference to religious law make it more likely that the courts will rule that 
the prohibitions on child marriage in international law and Afghan statutes are invalid because 
they contradict a fundamentalist view of the “beliefs and provisions” of Islam.456  Such a ruling 
would further diminish Afghan girls’ and women’s prospects for true “liberation.”  
AN IRAQI THEOCRACY? 
¶105  Despite many differences, there are important similarities between the situations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.457  Both Iraq and Afghanistan are majority Muslim countries, with populations 
of similar sizes, occupied by the U.S. and its coalition allies as a result of their complicity in 
international terrorism.458  As in Afghanistan, regime change in Iraq has ended the rule of a 
vicious tyrant.  Like Mullah Omar, Saddam Hussein presided over mass murder on a systematic 
basis (although in Iraq this occurred with support from most of the U.N. Security Council, not 
under conditions of international isolation as in Afghanistan).  And similar struggles are 
underway in both countries between religious fundamentalists, who would implement a medieval 
version of religious law, and reformers who seek to modernize and secularize their society so as 
to guarantee the rights of women and ethnic or religious minorities.   
From the Ba’ath to a Religious State  
¶106  Any discussion of human rights in Iraq’s recent history must begin with the crimes 
committed by Saddam Hussein over the past few decades with the cooperation and support of 
several foreign powers.  Saddam’s Ba’ath Arab Socialist party seized power in a U.S.-backed 
coup in 1963,459 and summarily executed thousands of Iraqi intellectuals identified as suspected 
leftists on lists provided by the CIA.460  After taking the helm of the Ba’ath party in 1979, 
Saddam launched two wars, against Iran in 1979 and Kuwait in 1990, which claimed the lives of 
more than 600,000 Iraqis.461  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Saddam’s military put down 
Iranian-backed rebellions from the Kurdish and Shi’a communities in Iraq,462 killing 100,000 to 
200,000 people.463  In order to commit these crimes, Saddam’s government secured massive 
financial and military support from an array of foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, 
France, China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the U.S.464   
¶107 Despite the disastrous wars, rebellions, and crimes against humanity under Saddam’s rule, 
Iraq’s population increased by almost five million people from 1980 to 1990.465  Life expectancy 
increased by almost 14 years on average between 1975 and 1990, as the government helped 
ensure that 90% of the population had access to safe drinking water and modern facilities for 
sanitation and health care.466  The 1991 Gulf War reversed much of this progress, as the U.S. 
deliberately bombed water purification, sewage, and electricity facilities,467 and lobbied for 
comprehensive economic sanctions to be imposed by the U.N. Security Council which 
eventually led to the deaths of one million Iraqis,468 including 500,000 Iraqi children.469    
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¶108 Expressing outrage at Iraq’s poor human rights record,470 floating questionable assertions 
about the threat its unconventional weapons and ties to al Qaeda posed to international peace 
and security,471 and rejecting Iraq’s offers to allow U.S. military access to suspected weapons 
sites and to hold free elections,472 the Bush administration decided to invade the country and 
depose Saddam Hussein.473  The war claimed the lives of up to 60,000 Iraqi soldiers,474 along 
with about 100,000 innocent Iraqi civilians as of September 2004.475  The Iraqi death rate more 
than doubled,476 as the rates of disease, malnutrition, and infant mortality soared.477  War and 
looting destroyed Iraq’s hospitals and water infrastructure along with most public buildings.478  
The unemployment rate for Iraqis doubled to 60 percent,479 the remains of the water and 
sanitation systems collapsed,480 and more than 3,000 schools were bombed, looted, or otherwise 
destroyed.481  Hundreds of thousands of people became homeless.482   
¶109 The Iraqi government appointed by the multinational forces enshrined religion as the basis 
of the new Iraq.  After the end of “major combat operations,” the U.S. established a Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) and an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to manage the country.  The 
U.S. handed 60% of the seats on the Iraqi Governing Council to Shia Muslims with long-
standing ties to the theocrats in Iran.  These council members subsequently used their power to 
promulgate fundamentalist laws for the country, repealing more secular laws guaranteeing 
women’s equality that had been enforced by the previous regime.483  Article 7 of Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL), which is intended to serve as an interim Iraqi constitution until a 
more permanent one can be ratified in late 2005,484 states that: “Islam is the official religion of 
the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally 
agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this 
Law may be enacted during the transitional period.”485  According to a prominent commentator 
on religious freedom, every Arab state whose constitution establishes an official religion in this 
way has an abysmal record of respecting civil and political rights; such clauses are used to 
implement “state-coerced Islamization, discrimination and even state-sanctioned persecution of 
religious minorities, as, for example, in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.”486  The clause mandating 
compliance with all laws with the requirements of Islam goes beyond what previous Iraqi 
constitutions contemplated in fusing religion and the state, and hands religious fundamentalists 
veto power over the political development of the country.487  In effect, it establishes religious 
scholars as the authorities on what Iraq’s supreme law provides, outlaws secular government, 
and threatens to create a theocracy in Iraq.488 
¶110 The public statements of the Iraqi fundamentalist leaders most likely to implement the 
TAL confirm that its provisions make theocracy a distinct possibility.  Iraq’s interim prime 
minister virtually declared allegiance to Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, describing him as 
standing at the “forefront” of all of the country’s other religious authorities on the occasion of the 
handover of sovereignty from the CPA.489  The alliance of Ayatollah Sistani and the Supreme 
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq resembles the movement of Ayatollah Khomeini of 
Iran in that it demands that fundamentalist religious law be used to deny equal rights to women 
and religious minorities.490  The alliance receives large donations from the spiritual capital of 
Iran and uses them to maintain private armies, along with a website detailing the characteristics 
of the planned fundamentalist state.491  Although Ayatollah Sistani has promised to be less active 
in politics than Ayatollah Khomeini believed that clerics should be, the latter also made 
reassuring statements to the West about democracy, religious freedom, and women’s rights, 
behaving quite differently once securely in power.492  The Iraqi Ayatollahs have been even less 
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moderate in tone than Khomeini, in some respects493; they openly “‘use religion in order to 
assume power,’” in the words of the former head of the IGC.494 
¶111 In the January 2005 election, a coalition of Iraqi Shia fundamentalist parties claimed about 
half of all votes, and promptly declared that religious law would be implemented.495  The 
coalition will control more than 130 seats in the 275-member Iraqi National Assembly charged 
with drafting a permanent constitution.496  Its architect and inspiration, Ayatollah Sistani, has 
pledged that the coalition will insist upon making Islam the sole source of legislation in the 
permanent constitution and prohibiting any law that is contrary to his version of Islam.497  The 
close ties of leading Iraqi politicians to the Iranian theocracy do not bode well for Iraqi freedom.  
With opposition to the Iranian government’s most conservative religious policies reportedly 
widespread,498 some elements in the country’s leadership have resorted to torturing and 
executing thousands to maintain power.499  Should Iraq follow the lead of its larger neighbor, a 
similar drama may play out for decades to come, as it has in many other theocracies known to 
history.   
Iraqi Women Face Intensified Discrimination 
¶112 Although like the Taliban, Saddam Hussein’s government implemented extremely brutal 
policies against women, it also had a better record on women’s equality in some respects than 
some of its Arab neighbors.  The Iraqi Ba’ath party started out as a more secular, forward-
looking party towards women, and by 2002 Iraqi women could exercise more control over their 
mode of dress, education, employment, and entertainment than in neighboring countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Kuwait.500  Iraqi women made up 38% of Iraq’s doctors,501 enrolled in 
primary school 50% more often than Saudi women,502 and worked as teachers and professors 
50% more often than Saudi women.503  But after suffering a crisis of legitimacy after the Gulf 
War in 1991, Saddam’s regime turned to violent anti-woman policies in an effort to build support 
for the regime among religious and tribal conservatives.  Iraq amended its Penal Code to exempt 
men who murder female family members in the name of family honor, after which Iraqi men 
murdered over 4,000 female relatives.504  Under the pretext of ending prostitution, pro-
government paramilitary Fedayeen killed over 200 women tied to the political opposition.505   
¶113 Women suffered along with many other Iraqis as a result of the war to oust Saddam.  A 
breakdown of law and order after the fall of Iraq’s government resulted in the rapes of hundreds 
of Iraqi women.506  Violent deaths of men, women and children tripled.507  Young girls are being 
sold into slavery.508  Many women are too afraid even to leave their homes, let alone participate 
actively in developing a secular government that respects the equal rights of its citizens.509   
¶114 Women’s minimal representation in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government has 
proved inadequate to protect their interests.  Although women make up more than 50% of Iraq’s 
population, the Bush administration gave them only two out of 25 seats on the IGC, less than 
10% of the available seats.510  Despite many trained Iraqi women lawyers, only 15 out of the 
thousands of people given judgeships by the CPA were women.511  Not one of the Iraqi lawyers 
hand-picked by the U.S. to draft a new constitution was a woman,512 a record of total exclusion 
that was all the more surprising because Afghanistan, with a far worse record on women’s 
participation in public life, had many women involved in its constitutional drafting process.   
¶115 Iraqi women judges and lawyers have decried the increased influence of religious 
fundamentalists on the IGC and other Iraqi institutions.  They expressed outrage when the IGC 
announced reforms to Iraqi family law that would refuse women the right to divorce in most 
cases and automatically deny mothers custody of children who reached the age of religious 
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instruction (nine years old).513  They objected that the new laws would “allow anyone who calls 
himself a cleric to open an Islamic court in his house and decide about who can marry and 
divorce and have rights.”514  “This will send us home and shut the door, just like what happened 
to women in Afghanistan,” one Kurdish woman lawyer declared.515  Even a member of the IGC 
recognized “that the law of the tyrant Saddam was more modern than this new law.”516  
Although even more extreme laws have been enforced in Afghanistan, Iraqi women have 
enjoyed more educational and professional opportunities than in many other large Arab or 
Muslim countries, and have not yet become accustomed to the levels of violence and disrespect 
inflicted upon Afghan women.  Eventually their protests prompted the CPA to drop the law 
reform plan.517   
¶116 With the passage of the TAL and the commencement of a constitutional drafting process 
expected to be dominated by the Ayatollahs and their private armies, Iraqi women may be out of 
the frying pan, and into the fire.  Although the TAL guarantees women equal rights before the 
law and a non-binding goal of 25 percent of seats in the Iraqi legislature, these provisions may be 
meaningless if, under Article 7 of the TAL,518 Ayatollah Sistani and other Iraqi fundamentalists 
get to exercise veto power over Iraq’s laws and legal system in the name of the “tenets of 
Islam.”519  Among the Taliban-like laws Ayatollah Sistani would like to see implemented are 
bans on: women showing their faces or most parts of their bodies in public; girls or women who 
are virgins getting married without their father’s or grandfather’s permission; wives leaving their 
houses without their husband’s permission; men and women dating or having a conversation in a 
private place; and even simple entertainments such as music, dancing, and chess.520  He would 
permit a father or grandfather to arrange the marriages of his children before puberty, and even 
before the age of nine.521   
¶117 While the Kurdish parties that have controlled northern Iraq since 1991 are promoted in the 
U.S. media as a more moderate alternative to the Shia religious parties, their policies towards 
women have also been extremely harsh.  The Kurdish region they led passed a law allowing men 
to kill their wives for disobedience, an offer that an estimated 550 men accepted between 1991 
and 1994.522  An Iraqi women’s rights activist blamed the Kurdish nationalist parties for 
complicity in more than 8,000 “honor killings” of women since they gained control over 
northern Iraq.523  Like the Afghan warlords after the Taliban, the policies of these leaders may 
perpetuate the oppression of women.   
Iraqi Christians Flee Fundamentalist Atrocities 
¶118  A key difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that the former has a large population – 
estimated at one to two million persons – of Christians, including the Assyrians, the indigenous 
population of Iraq.524  Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the one million Christian 
Assyrians in Iraq have suffered continued tyranny, garbed in religious fervor rather than Ba’ath 
Arab nationalism.525  Ayatollah Sistani’s legal rulings dictate that Jews and Christians are 
unclean,526 and consistent with this “unclean” status, Iraqi fundamentalists have subjected their 
Christian countrymen to postwar reprisals worthy of Germany just before Kristallnacht: Iraqi 
Christians are being murdered in the dozens, several of their number are kidnapped and raped 
each week, and many of their large businesses have been looted and burned.527  Schoolteachers 
employed by the Iraqi state are preaching religion in class and forcing Christian girls to wear 
veils.528  Armed bands of religious fanatics “roam the streets…, exacting their brand of what they 
call God’s law.”529  Conditions are so bad that a few even recall Saddam’s old regime as being 
preferable.530  Over 45,000 Iraqi Christians who survived Saddam have fled Iraq since the war.531 
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¶119 While many Iraqi Christians hoped that the 2005 election would guarantee them 
proportional representation in the Iraqi National Assembly that will draft a permanent 
constitution, hundreds of thousands of Christian voters were denied the right to vote because 
their designated polling centers never opened on election day, or had no ballots.532  Voter turnout 
was only 17% in and around the Mosul area in Nineveh province, the Assyrian Christian 
homeland.533  “Quite a significant number of Christians in the Mosul area were denied ballot 
boxes and ballots,” the Iraqi deputy prime minister admitted.534  The result is that Christians will 
be underrepresented in the constitutional drafting process.535 
CONCLUSION 
¶120 Referring to the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq from dictatorship, President George W. 
Bush declared, “No President has ever done more for human rights than I have.”536  President 
Bush has stated that the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have freed these countries 
from their long histories of oppression, established or nearly established democratic rule, and 
liberated women to participate equally in politics and society.   
¶121 Although both nations are as close to democracy and respect for individual rights as they 
have been in many years, the elevation of Iranian-style theocrats to many of their key leadership 
positions remains a serious obstacle along the path to the promised freedom.  The political reality 
in Afghanistan and Iraq is too often that austere U.S.-backed fundamentalists control thousands 
of armed militiamen with tenuous allegiance to the central government, and exploit these private 
armies to distort the legal and political development of their countries towards theocracy.  These 
militia commanders and their allies have wantonly violated the human rights of women and 
religious and ethnic minorities.  Despite their many abuses, no comprehensive effort to disarm 
these private armies is underway, or perhaps even possible, in either country.537 
¶122 A more complex understanding of the history of Afghanistan and Iraq, both before and 
after the intervention of the U.S.-led coalitions, is critical to assessing the impact of the Bush 
doctrine on human rights and respect for international law.  An appreciation of the atrocities of 
the Taliban and Saddam Hussein is indispensable to such an assessment.  At the same time, the 
influence bestowed upon fundamentalist warlords and their allies in Afghanistan has resulted in 
the continuing oppression of the Afghan people, and challenges the Bush administration’s simple 
narrative of a liberation from the Taliban resulting in equal rights for women and democracy for 
all.  Likewise, the central role of fundamentalist politicians and militia leaders in post-Saddam 
Iraq should temper the triumphal attitude that followed the capture of Baghdad.   
¶123 Considering the mounting human and financial cost of U.S. military operations, which 
could probably save tens of millions of lives per year if devoted to international health care 
spending, more thorough study of human rights justifications for U.S. military interventions is 
critical.538  The historical record of U.S. “liberation” of other countries, while impressive, is 
mixed.  German-occupied Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Bosnia have all enjoyed remarkable 
advances in human rights, democratic governance, women’s rights, and economic growth since 
the U.S. and its allies toppled or repelled dictatorial regimes.539  But American colonization, 
military occupation and political intervention have failed to produce lasting freedom in many 
Third World countries more similarly situated to Iraq and Afghanistan.  A number of countries 
have actually experienced worsening human rights situations and even genocide, sometimes with 
the direct involvement of the U.S. military, since the U.S. intervened in their internal affairs.540  
Compared to these current and former American political protégés, the cause of women’s 
equality has fared better in many respects in several other Third World countries that have not 
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experienced American military occupation or political control.541  In light of the poor results of 
many prominent interventions in the Third World, the Bush administration’s optimistic 
projections for its reconstruction efforts appear to be premature at best, and warrant more careful 
scrutiny given their large and rising costs in terms of loss of life and economic devastation.   
¶124 When the fundamentalist policies of many post-Taliban Afghan warlords or Iraqi religious 
parties are raised as objections to U.S. support for these forces, the typical response is to 
compare these U.S. allies favorably to the Taliban or Saddam Hussein.542  But many Afghans 
and Iraqis may wonder why the practices of Afghan warlords and Iraqi fundamentalists are not 
instead compared unfavorably to international human rights standards or even to the existing 
practices of neighboring countries such as present-day Lebanon or Tajikistan, where 
discrimination against women and religious minorities is less often practiced.  For them, the right 
question is not whether Afghan warlords are better than the Taliban or the Ayatollahs better than 
Saddam Hussein, but whether the future Afghan and Iraqi governments will be so much better 
that regime change will have justified the death and maiming of thousands of civilians in the 
invasion and occupation of their lands.543  The answer will only be revealed after several decades 
have passed, and the fate of U.S.-imposed “Islamic democracy” is known to history.  
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